Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.
Since the US and Israel went to war with Iran in February 2026, the world has been using more oil than it produces. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are effectively closed to oil shipping, cutting off roughly 20% of the world's oil supply. Russian refinery strikes and export bans are making the situation worse. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.
The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and how the shortage affects people and businesses. You can use the charts below to see what's changed and explore three ways the crisis could unfold. The model estimates how long stored oil could last in each case, and keeps a record of its predictions so you can see how they hold up.
Last updated Sep 18, 2026
Brent
$104.82
Sep 17 settlement · −1.0% vs. prior close $105.83 (Sep 16) · +38% vs pre-crisis ~$76
US diesel (AAA)
$6.45
Sep 18 · all-time high $6.4476 · ninth consecutive daily record · +73% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.47
Sep 18 · +17¢ in a week (AAA) · +59% vs Jan $2.81
SPR
285.0M
Sep 11 · down 0.4M in a week · down 130.5M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982
US diesel & heating oil
107.9M
Sep 11 · up 1.6M in a week · 13.5% below last year · East Coast stocks 31% below last year
These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. Every plotted value comes from a source. Missing readings are left out.
EIA weekly, national
The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.47, an increase of about 59%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.
AAA national, sourced points
Diesel cost $3.72 in the last week before the war, on Feb 27. By Sep 18, it had reached $6.45, about 73% higher. That was its ninth consecutive daily record. It passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4.
TTF, $/MMBtu · filled: EIA weekly futures avgs (Jan–Apr) · hollow: individual contract quotes (May–Sep) · different instruments — a trend, not one series
TTF is the benchmark used to track natural gas prices in Europe. It traded above $28 on Sep 10, eased to $27.00 on Sep 11, and stood at about $27.80 on Sep 14 — the highest levels since December 2022. That's roughly 153% above the price before the strait closed. The Sep 14 value is converted from €81.98 per megawatt-hour to the dollar units used in this chart. Prices have risen as unplanned maintenance at Norway's Asgard and Troll fields and tanker attacks put pressure on supplies.
By January 20, European gas storage had fallen to 48%, compared with a five-year average of 63%. Running that low left Europe buying liquefied natural gas (LNG) for immediate delivery during the season the strait closed.
JKM, $/MMBtu · filled: EIA weekly futures avgs (Jan–Apr) · hollow: assessed spot (May–Sep) · different instruments — a trend, not one series
JKM tracks the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. It reached the high-$28s on Sep 10 — its highest level in roughly two and a half years — and held around $28.50 on Sep 11, about 167% above the price before the closure (JOGMEC). Damaged production units at Qatar's Ras Laffan complex — about 17% of the country's LNG export capacity — are expected to be offline for 3–5 years, forcing Asian buyers to look elsewhere for supplies. With little gas in storage, the region is particularly sensitive to changes in supply and weather.
Brent: sourced points (EIA monthly avgs: Mar $103.0 · Apr $117.29 · Jul $83.76) · WTI: weekly (FRED)
Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) are crude oil price benchmarks. On Sep 17, Brent settled at $104.82 a barrel and WTI closed at $101.91. The gray line shows WTI, which is also used in the fuel price spread chart beside this one.
Brent shows selected observations, including March's intraday peak and July's monthly average. Most WTI readings come from FRED's weekly spot series. The readings for Sep 10–11 and Sep 14–17 are futures closes. Hollow markers indicate a source's rounded estimate.
Retail price less WTI, $/bbl · weekly (EIA/AAA − FRED).
This chart subtracts the price of crude oil from the retail price of fuel, with both expressed in dollars per barrel. The difference covers refining, transportation, and retailing. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper.
Diesel's spread was about $89 in January. It briefly narrowed to $148 on Sep 10, when crude prices rose faster than pump prices. It reached $160.3 on Sep 14, then fell to $157.5 on Sep 15. It rose to $162.6 on Sep 16 and $166.7 on Sep 17, its highest plotted value, as the diesel pump price set an eighth consecutive daily record. Gasoline's spread has also widened, from about $59 to $84.5.
The calculation uses retail prices from EIA and AAA, minus WTI from FRED, with futures closes for Sep 10–11 and Sep 14–17. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so the values differ. Six of the plotted fuel readings have no same-day WTI price. For those readings, the chart uses the nearest trading day's price, within 1–2 days. No missing prices are estimated.
When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show how much oil has been withdrawn, how much is left, and how long the US emergency reserve could last under each of the model's three scenarios.
Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has had to draw on stored oil every month. The IEA's latest report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.7 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil, and expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027. Global production fell to 100.1 million barrels per day in August, with more than 10 million barrels per day of Gulf production still shut down. Saudi production alone fell by 2.3 million barrels per day that month, to 5.97 million.
World oil balance, million b/d — production minus consumption, EIA STEO Table 3a, reported months (Jan–Aug actuals; the EIA's forecast tail is not shown) · the physical loss peaked at 11.2M b/d of Gulf shut-in in May — demand destruction and non-Gulf supply absorbed most of it · the IEA's observed-inventories count: 507 mb drawn since February — 2.8 mb/d on average, 95 mb of it in August alone.
Withdrawals and changes in demand, using figures available as of Sep 11.
Global commercial stocks
−400M bbl
year-to-date · EIA est. (Sep 9)
US Strategic Petroleum Reserve
−130.5M bbl
since Feb 28 · EIA
IEA coordinated release
400M bbl
pulled from 32 countries · IEA
China commercial stockpiles
~2–3M b/d
withdrawals inferred from customs data · official SPR untouched
Decline in oil demand
−2.5M b/d
full-year 2026, cut from −1.6 in the August edition · IEA OMR, Sep 11
Remaining supply shortfall
−1.8M b/d
Q3 2026 forecast — supply below demand · IEA OMR, Aug 12
These stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They stood at 423.4 million barrels on Sep 11, up from 404.5 million on Jul 24. That's 8.1 million barrels above the same week last year and 1% above the five-year average, according to the EIA. SPR releases have helped supply the commercial system this year. Moving that oil out of the reserve doesn't increase the total amount stored across the two stockpiles.
EIA weekly ending stocks, excl. SPR, million bbl · the Jul 24 low sat 22.2M below the same week in 2025
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Sep 11, puts it at 285.0 million, down 0.4 million barrels in a week. Withdrawals slowed for a third straight week, from 1.2 million the week before and 3.1 million the week before that. Oil is being released to help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf. You can use the withdrawal rate to see how quickly the emergency supply is being used.
The Department of Energy releases oil from the SPR through contracts and scheduled deliveries. A supply shortage doesn't automatically trigger withdrawals. The dashed lines start at the Sep 11 level and assume withdrawals continue at 0.45M, 0.70M, or 1.35M barrels a day. The latest reported week averaged about 60,000 barrels a day. The shipping odds don't tell you how likely the reserve is to reach the projected levels by those dates.
The red lines mark the model's reserve thresholds, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels.
In its Sep 16 report, the EIA said commercial crude stocks fell 0.6 million barrels. The American Petroleum Institute (API) had reported an increase for that week. Diesel stocks rose for a second straight week, to 107.9 million barrels, but East Coast stocks are still 31% below last year.
The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum. The model stops withdrawals at 70M.
Weekly withdrawals fell from 3.1 million to 1.2 million, then to 0.4 million barrels in the week ending Sep 11. Diesel stocks rose for a second straight week, up 1.6 million barrels, according to the EIA's Sep 16 report.
Estimated shipping odds, updated when specified events occur.
These odds describe what could happen to shipping. Each reserve path assumes a steady withdrawal rate, which depends on government releases and deliveries continuing.
Oil loadings at Yanbu, the pipeline's export port, stopped while the pipeline remained shut. Oil could no longer leave through the Saudi bypass. In Libya, guards shut the Hamada–Zawiya pipeline, halting two oil fields.
The Saudi bypass pipeline was suspended, and the Houthis held the entire Red Sea coast. An official pipeline restart would return the odds to 10/50/40.
Tanker losses reached 10 per week, Brent passed $100, and Jazan was affected.
A shipping exclusion zone was imposed, and a base in a third country was hit for the first time.
Reported Hormuz traffic of 8.6M barrels per day was not backed by vessel tracking, which showed 7% of normal transits.
Initial model: about 65% odds of de-escalation.
Corridor holds
10%
Tankers can pass through Hormuz under an Iran–Oman agreement or with US escorts. Traffic gradually returns to normal over one to two quarters.
In this scenario, Brent moves toward $70–80. The reserve path assumes withdrawals of 0.45M barrels per day, so stored oil lasts longer if releases continue at that rate.
Standoff
35%
The war continues at its current intensity. Tanker attacks and shipping restrictions persist, some Iranian infrastructure remains offline, and the damaged Saudi bypass has no restart date. The strait remains partly open.
Brent stays in the $100–120 range. The reserve path assumes continuing withdrawals of 0.70M barrels per day. Global stocks keep falling, with shortages developing later.
Corridor lapses
55%
The disruption becomes a sustained closure or the fighting escalates. Tanker losses rise, shipping restrictions remain, and the bypass, Abqaiq, and Jazan stay offline for months.
Brent rises above $130. The reserve path assumes continuing withdrawals of 1.35M barrels per day. Shortages spread from the US East Coast to Russia, Europe, China, and aviation fuel.
These odds are based on judgment. They change when specified events occur, such as a pipeline restarting or a shipping agreement breaking down. A quiet week alone doesn't change them. You can read the rules and the events being watched on the model page.
This chart puts the current reserve in perspective. It held 727 million barrels at its December 2009 peak and 270.5 million in August 1982. It held 285.0 million on Sep 11. The green line marks the level before the war. In the model, withdrawals stop at the 70 million barrel floor.
Large withdrawals began on Apr 3, when the reserve held 413.3 million barrels. They reached about 1.2 million barrels per day in May. In the week ending Sep 11, withdrawals totaled about 0.4 million barrels, or roughly 60,000 a day. Weekly withdrawals slowed for a third straight week, from 3.1M to 1.2M to 0.4M barrels. The daily rate is far below the 0.45 million barrels assumed in the corridor-holds scenario.
US diesel and heating-oil stocks were 13.5% below a year earlier on Sep 11, according to the EIA.
SPR
285.0M bbl
−130.5M (−31%) since pre-war 415.4M
Lowest since Nov 1982 · down 0.4M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — third straight week of slowing withdrawals
US diesel & heating oil
107.9M bbl
Up 1.6M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — the second weekly increase in a row; 13.5% below last year (EIA)
East Coast (PADD 1) stocks are 31% below last year
US crude
423.4M bbl
Down 0.6M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — EIA reported a decrease, while the American Petroleum Institute (API) had reported an increase
Refined fuels remain in shorter supply than crude oil
Global inventories
−400M bbl YTD
EIA estimate, Sep 9
falling through end of 2026
The latest withdrawal rate and estimated dates for reaching the reserve thresholds, using the EIA's Sep 16 report for the week ending Sep 11.
SPR withdrawal rate
0.3million barrels/day
4-week average, EIA weekly report (week ending Sep 11) · latest single week: 0.06.
Weekly withdrawals: about 9.1M barrels at the mid-June peak (week ending Jun 19), falling to 0.4M by Sep 11. The earlier 9.9M peak in the week ending May 15 falls outside this 16-week chart.
250M barrels if withdrawals average 1.35M a day
≈ Oct 72026
This date assumes continuing releases. Withdrawals could pause.
Starting from the reported 285.0M barrels on Sep 11, the corridor-lapse path uses 1.35M barrels a day. At the standoff path's assumed 0.70M a day, the same threshold would be reached on Oct 31.
At those same assumed rates, 180M barrels would be reached around Nov 28, 2026(1.35M a day) or Feb 8, 2027 (0.70M a day).
Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.
Utilization, % of operable capacity, weekly.
US refineries have operated above 95% of their available capacity every week since Jun 5, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28 and easing to 96.8% in the week ending Sep 11. Across the January–September weeks shown, utilization averaged 90.7% in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.
EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), week ending Friday · utilization = gross inputs ÷ latest reported operable capacity (EIA's definition) · 2025 line = same Jan–Sep window · in mb/d: runs 16.3–17.3 (STEO 4a), above 2025 in every month · see the fuel price spread chart in Prices for the effect on costs.
Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's August and September reports show the size of the decline.
Global refining, August
81.4 mb/d
summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)
Refining forecast, 2026
−2.6 mb/d
IEA forecast vs 2025 (OMR, Sep 11)
Q3 forecast revision
−370 kb/d
the quarter's further cut (OMR, Aug 12)
estimated capacity remaining, % of pre-strike
Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The chart shows about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April and about 70% by Aug 29, according to the Moscow Times. The red bar shows how much current estimates differ: Ukraine's General Staff puts the capacity lost at 42.74%, Russian Forbes at 54%, and the IEA at more than 20%. You can compare these estimates with the reported outages and export restrictions below.
capacity offline
>30%
Aug 29, Moscow Times — up from ~25% in April
Early September estimates of capacity offline: 42.7% (Ukraine's General Staff) to 54% (Forbes)
strikes in August
21+
record month, near-daily (Bloomberg, Aug 29)
Kirishi — Russia's #2 plant
halted
~400K b/d, its only NW plant, two strikes in a month (UA.NEWS, Sep 2)
Ryazan (Rosneft) — Moscow's main supplier
down
~156K barrels/day; both primary units offline since Sep 6, with repairs expected to take several weeks (Reuters, Sep 10)
Perm capacity
−86%
primary capacity, satellite imagery (Bloomberg, Aug 25)
every major Lukoil refinery is offline
Novorossiysk — main Black Sea port
hit
fuel-oil terminal + the city, 4 killed (Sep 8–9)
crude outflow 800 → 350 kb/d, Jul → Aug — all three export directions now under attack
stations rationed
28%
nationwide caps; Moscow 90% out of AI-92 (Euronews, Aug 20)
gasoline contracts unmet
>50%
TASS, Sep 3
oil & gas revenue
−45.4%
YoY, Q1 official
Lost production is also reducing government revenue
Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. The diesel export ban expires on Sep 30, and the jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.
Sep 30, 2026
diesel exports
Nov 30, 2026
jet fuel exports
Jan 31, 2027
gasoline & the remaining diesel
Imports aren't making up the difference. Fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route are running at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects countries that rely on Russian fuel: Kyrgyzstan imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.
Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. The charts below show that decline alongside recession estimates, interest rates, and the possible effects on food prices.
World petroleum & liquid fuels consumption, mb/d · monthly (EIA STEO, Sep 9 release) · Jan – Aug, 2026 vs 2025.
World oil use fell 4.3 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 4%. The gap narrowed to 3.6 million in July and 0.8 million in August. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy. The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. These estimates aren't universally agreed on. OPEC expects demand to grow by 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026, a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.
EIA STEO Table 3e (Sep 9 2026, forecast completed Sep 3) · Jan–Aug 2026 are actuals in that release · world/regional values are EIA estimates (apparent consumption, incl. refinery fuel & bunkering) · Sep 2026 onward is forecast, not shown.
Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.
World
−3.6
105.4 → 101.8 mb/d
Middle East
−1.2
10.2 → 8.9 mb/d
Asia & Oceania
−1.9
37.9 → 36.0 mb/d
China
−0.8
16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption
Europe
−0.1
14.8 → 14.7 mb/d
United States
−0.4
21.0 → 20.5 mb/d
These estimates, published between June and September 2026, put the chance of a US recession over the next 12 months at 15% to 50%. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket puts the odds at 32%, but covers a longer period, through the end of 2027. Keep that difference in mind when comparing the figures.
The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to support a slowing economy, but persistent inflation makes that harder. August producer prices rose 5.4% from a year earlier. Consumer inflation held at 3.4%, with energy up 16.3%, while core inflation eased to 2.4%.
On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.
Fed's target rate, Sep 16
3.75–4.00%
Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'
Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28
60%
Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll score this prediction after the October decision
Aug PPI (BLS, Sep 10)
5.4% YoY
+0.4% for the month · July revised to 4.8% annually · energy +4.2%, diesel +24.1% annually · 10-year yield highest since Oct 2023
The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.
You can see the wider effects in borrowing costs and everyday prices. Both are at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed cited elevated inflation and described the economy as growing at a solid pace.
10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Sep 17 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17: Yahoo closing values.
The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.
The 10-year yield closed at 4.975% on Sep 11 after briefly reaching 4.992%, its highest level since October 2023. It eased to 4.961% on Sep 14, then closed at 4.996% on Sep 15, ahead of the Federal Reserve's 12-to-0 decision to raise rates. On Sep 16, it closed at 5.006%, its first close above 5% since the war began. On Sep 17, it eased back to 4.947%, returning below 5%. Al Jazeera reported that it reached 5.02% during Sep 15 trading, its highest level since 2007.
The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The market's measure of expected inflation over the next 10 years eased to 2.36%. That suggests investors are seeking higher returns after inflation, even as their inflation expectations have fallen.
CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · Jan – Aug.
Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and stayed there in August. Prices rose 0.4% in August alone, with gasoline's 3.9% increase accounting for more than a third of that rise. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, eased from 2.5% to 2.4% over the year, although its 0.3% monthly increase was above expectations. Producer prices rose faster, peaking at 5.9% in May and increasing 5.4% in August compared with a year earlier. July's reading was revised to 4.8%. Energy explains much of the increase, with diesel up 24.1%. These costs can reach businesses before they show up in household spending (BLS, Sep 10–11).
Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.
The timeline uses the 2007–08 and 2022 shocks to illustrate when those costs could reach food prices. It's a rough historical comparison, not a forecast from this model.
Gulf–India tanker freight
+411%
$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)
TTF gas (Europe)
€82/MWh
Sep 14 · above $28/MMBtu Sep 10 (JOGMEC) · highest since Dec 2022
JKM gas (Asia)
$28.5/MMBtu
Sep 11 · high-$28s Sep 10 (JOGMEC) · highest in ~2.5 years
Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate windows based on the 2007–08 and 2022 shocks. Food prices could remain under pressure after oil reserves have reached the model's thresholds.
Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.
Any day
An official repair estimate for the East–West pipeline. Bloomberg cites a person familiar with the matter who says Riyadh aims to restore about half its capacity within days and full capacity in six weeks. No official timetable has been published.
The standoff scenario depends on this bypass. An official assessment that repairs will take only days would reverse the Sep 11 change in odds.
Any day
A date for the next round of talks. Iran's foreign minister, Araghchi, is in Beijing. Iran says it has agreed with Oman on a plan to reopen the strait, but Oman hasn't confirmed it.
Resuming the talks could help restore tanker access through Hormuz.
Any day
Whether attacks in Bab el-Mandeb spread to non-Saudi vessels.
An attack on a non-Saudi vessel would raise the model's odds that the shipping corridor closes.
Any day
How banks respond to the Sep 14 sanctions on Russia's VTB.
If banks stop handling VTB's payments, Iran loses channels for receiving oil revenue.
Any day
Whether US–Houthi talks lead to an easing of the blockade of Saudi ships.
That would help shipping through Bab el-Mandeb and support the standoff scenario.
Any day
Ship traffic through Hormuz. Kpler counted 7 crossings on Sep 14, 12 on Sep 15 (revised from 4), and 3 on Sep 16. Windward counted 12 on Sep 16, including three unidentified large crude tankers detected only in satellite images.
Trackers and US officials report different levels of traffic. A sustained drop in crossings would undercut the claimed oil volume.
Any day
New SPR exchange contracts and delivery schedules.
Existing deliveries may be nearing completion, but the end date isn't confirmed. New deliveries could increase withdrawals.
Sep 23
The EIA's report for the week ending Sep 18, the first to partially cover the shutdown of Yanbu loadings.
Watch for faster SPR withdrawals, lower commercial crude stocks, or falling diesel stocks.
Sep 30
Russia's diesel export ban expires unless extended; the US-led coalition completes its withdrawal from Iraq; prediction-market bets settle.
Several deadlines in one week, each with supply or price implications.
Oct 6
The EIA's next monthly oil outlook.
Watch whether the EIA still expects shipping to continue despite restrictions.
Nov 3
The US midterm elections. President Trump has said the war will end just afterward.
Watch whether fighting and diplomacy match the administration's stated timeline.
Nov 30
Russia's jet-fuel export ban is due to end (it has been in force since Jun 1).
Ending it would return Russian jet fuel to export markets, easing the tight global supply. Watch for an extension announcement — Russia has extended its other fuel bans.
These are estimates of where shortages could become more severe if the crisis continues. The first two dates use published stock levels; the others are inferred from customs and inventory data. Allow for uncertainty of a week or two.
Sep 14–21
US East Coast — Diesel and heating-oil stocks could fall below a month of supply. They are already 31% lower than last year.
Sep 30
Russia — The diesel export ban expires. With more than 30% of refining capacity damaged, Russia may have little fuel available to export.
≈ mid-October
China — Commercial oil stocks could begin to fall faster than normal.
≈ late October
Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, a level that would put pressure on trading. If the strait closes fully, the estimate moves up to mid-October.
≈ late October
Europe, at the pump — Shortages could reach consumers, with price increases putting pressure on governments.
Nov 10–30
Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.